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8. Standardisation from a Law and 
Economics Perspective
Michael Faure and Niels Philipsen
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this chapter is to examine standardisation from a law and eco-
nomics perspective. More particularly, it will focus on the role of private 
standard-setting and evaluate its potential advantages and disadvantages from 
an economic perspective. Attention will also be paid to the effects of standard-
isation and to the question of whether, within a federal system, harmonisation 
of standards is required from an economic perspective.
This chapter will not engage with the legal debate concerning the role of 
standardisation in regulation or case law; many other scholars have done so,1 
including in various other contributions to this volume.2 However, we do argue 
that the economic perspective provided in this chapter can certainly contribute 
to the European debate on standardisation. For example, in the legal debate, 
questions arise concerning the legitimacy of standardisation (an issue also 
addressed in this volume). Legitimacy is an issue that is not directly addressed 
in the economic literature. The reasons for this are twofold: first, legitimacy 
is not an economic notion; second, it is a strongly normative concept. Still, if 
a particular definition of legitimacy is provided, economists can make clear 
how, through the use of particular instruments, this concept of legitimacy 
could be promoted. In this way, the economic literature can contribute to the 
legal debate.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses the definition 
of the concept of ‘standards’ from a law and economics perspective. Focusing 
the discussion on private standards, Section 3 then provides an analysis of the 
social costs and benefits of such standards. Taking efficiency as the main cri-
1 Harm Schepel, ‘The New Approach to the New Approach: The Juridification 
of Harmonised Standards in EU Law’ (2013) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 20(4): 521–33.
2 See for example Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 in this volume.
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terion, economic theory allows us to look at how the introduction of standards 
(positively or negatively) affects, for example, information costs, transaction 
costs, administrative costs and competition. One conclusion from this section 
is that private standards are not always the best instrument to address an 
externality or information problem. We will also discuss how legitimacy 
fits into the economic framework, inter alia by explaining how increased 
transparency and public participation may lower information costs and social 
costs associated with lobbying by industry. We argue that potential problems 
of output legitimacy could be addressed by increasing countervailing power to 
strong industry lobbying groups, if reputational concerns are not sufficient for 
this purpose. A case by case approach is thus required. Moreover, we stress 
that making private standard-setting more accountable or legitimate will be at 
the expense of certain advantages of private standards in terms of flexibility 
and costs. Subsequently, Section 4 focuses on the question of whether stand-
ardisation necessarily implies harmonisation. Based on the ‘economics of 
federalism’ theory, we conclude that harmonisation is not self-evident, as it 
may have advantages as well as disadvantages. Section 5 addresses the impor-
tant question of whether it is possible to enjoy the benefits of standardisation 
without (most of its) disadvantages, by considering hybrid forms of regulation 
and competition between standard-setting bodies and by discussing the idea of 
also applying the criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU to an analysis of regulatory 
instruments such as standardisation. Section 6 concludes. 
2. STANDARDISATION: AN ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK
Standards are traditionally viewed in economic theory as part of regulation, 
that is, an intervention by the legislator to remedy a market failure (Section 
2.1). Various instruments could be used to remedy such a market failure 
(Section 2.2), whereby standards can be seen as the result of an economic 
process of cost–benefit weighing (Section 2.3). The literature generally distin-
guishes between various types of standards (Section 2.4), whereas standardi-
sation is also possible via private regulation, so-called private standard-setting 
(Section 2.5).
Before starting this section, it should be mentioned that the concept of 
standards is in some economic literature also used to distinguish it from rules: 
rules would be very precise obligations imposed by a regulator leaving little 
discretion to regulated parties; standards would rather focus on the result, be 
described in vaguer terms (often via case law) and leave more freedom to the 
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industry as to how to achieve the particular result.3 It is important to note that 
the standards we are referring to in this contribution do not necessarily fit into 
the definition of standards within this ‘rules versus standards’ debate, because 
what in the latter debate is referred to as a rule could for the purposes of this 
chapter equally be a standard.
2.1 Economic Argument for Regulation: Market Failure
Welfare economics teaches that, if particular conditions are met, more particu-
larly the existence of a general equilibrium in an economy with perfect compe-
tition in all markets, the resulting allocation will be Pareto efficient.4 However, 
these conditions will never be completely satisfied. There are market failures 
or market distortions. Regulation, in other words an intervention by law, 
is seen as a possible remedy for those market failures, aiming to lead to an 
increase in social welfare. Standards can be part of the legal remedy to market 
failure. Four basic types of market failure are distinguished in the literature:5
(Negative) externalities: Externalities arise if the activities of one subject 
cause (external) costs to another subject. For example, a factory discharging 
wastewater into the surface waters might cause negative externalities to users 
downstream.6
Information deficiencies: A second possible reason for regulation is that 
markets may not function optimally if there is a lack of information or even 
information asymmetry. Consumers particularly may lack information on the 
quality of services offered by professionals, while professionals may have this 
information, but lack the ability or willingness to communicate this to consum-
ers. The Nobel Prize winner Akerlof showed that asymmetric information can 
lead to the process of adverse selection,7 which in the end may lead to quality 
3 See Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 
Duke Law Journal 42: 557–629 and Franziska Weber, ‘European Integration Assessed 
in the Light of the “Rules vs Standards Debate”’ (2013) European Journal of Law and 
Economics 35(2): 187–210.
4 Niels J Philipsen, Regulation Of and By Pharmacists in the Netherlands and 
Belgium: An Economic Approach (Intersentia 2003) 10–11.
5 We merely present those classic market failures briefly for the purposes of this 
chapter; for a more extensive analysis see Philipsen, above n. 4, 12–19 and Robert 
Cooter and Tom Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th ed. (Pearson Education International 
2012) 38–42.
6 Positive externalities could also constitute a problem, but can be disregarded for 
the purposes of this chapter.
7 Adverse selection refers specifically to the phenomenon where buyers of 
a product or service are not able to recognise the quality offered by producers, as 
a result of which they will not be willing to pay higher prices for better quality prod-
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deterioration and an unravelling of markets.8 Also, an information advantage 
may be abused, leading to moral hazard.9 Regulation in the sense of law can be 
an answer to information deficiencies.
Lack of competition: A third classic market failure consists of market power 
or, more generally, all types of distortions in the functioning of the market 
mechanism. The best known are the abuse of a dominant position or cartel 
formation. Again, the lack of competition may lead to a loss of social welfare 
which regulation (more particularly competition law) should remedy.
Underprovision of public goods: A fourth form of market failure is the 
existence of so-called public goods.10 A public good has two characteristics: 
non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability. The first implies that 
consumption of the good by one person is not at the expense of another; the 
second means that it is either impossible or too expensive to exclude people 
from consuming the good. Classic examples of public goods are national 
defence, lighthouses and dykes. Precisely since others may not be excluded, 
the market will insufficiently generate those public goods. It relates to the 
so-called free-rider problem. Again, regulation should intervene (to increase 
social welfare) to guarantee a sufficient provision of public goods.
These four types of market failure are generally advanced as the so-called 
public interest arguments for regulation. Note that regulation in this economic 
literature generally refers to any intervention from the legal system to remedy 
the market failure. Regulation in this broad sense therefore not only refers to 
formal statutes or other public regulation issued by the government, but could 
also refer to private regulation.11 As will be shown below, standards prescribing 
a particular behaviour can appear in all kinds of legal instruments. Note that 
standards are often introduced to address particular types of market failure. 
For example, environmental standards prescribing emission limit values for 
wastewater could address an externality problem; standards for professionals 
(such as architects, accountants or lawyers) could address information asym-
ucts or services. As a result of this information asymmetry only products of average or 
low quality will appear on the market. That is why this is referred to as the ‘market for 
lemons’ in the famous article by Akerlof.
8 George A Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism’ (1970) Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488–500.
9 Niels J Philipsen, ‘Regulation of Liberal Professions and Competition Policy: 
Developments in the EU and China’ (2009) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 
6(2): 206.
10 Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press 
1994) 33–5.
11 It should be noted that other instruments, such as liability rules and taxation, 
can be alternatives to regulation for solving a particular market failure. See Section 2.2 
below.
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metry. At the same time, the mere fact of introducing standards may also have 
the consequence that it creates (or increases) another market failure, more par-
ticularly a restriction of competition. For example, if standards for accountants 
prescribe a particular behaviour, that may reduce the possibility of competition 
between those professionals. One of the crucial questions, therefore, is whether 
it is possible to use standards in such a way that they do remedy particular 
market failures (such as externalities or information asymmetry) without dis-
proportionately causing other market failures (such as restricting competition). 
That requires a balancing test verifying inter alia whether the standards are 
proportional to the market failure to be solved and whether they still leave 
sufficient room for competition between the market participants.
2.2 Instrument Choice
There is a range of options available to cure market failures. The question 
of which instrument should be used for which particular market failure and 
under what conditions has been addressed in the instrument choice literature, 
part of which is economic,12 but important contributions are also provided 
by socio-legal scholars.13 That literature points at a wide variety of possible 
instruments:
Rules of private law, such as civil liability: Under a regime of civil liability, 
courts can compel tortfeasors to compensate victims by selecting specific rules 
(negligence, strict liability and so on). Liability rules do not prescribe any 
particular standard of behaviour, but force the tortfeasor to compensate the 
harm that was caused. The idea is that this would provide incentives to take 
optimal care.
Public regulation – ‘command and control’: This consists of an administra-
tive system based on licences, permits and standard-setting by administrative 
agencies. Public regulation determines what the regulated community has to 
do. In other words, standards are determined ex ante and will be enforced with 
public (administrative or criminal) sanctions in case of non-compliance.
Market-based instruments: Another approach, already advocated in the 
1920s by Pigou, is the use of financial instruments to internalise externalities. 
These instruments are often referred to as ‘incentive-based’, ‘market-based’ or 
‘economic’ instruments. The basic idea of those mechanisms is to correct an 
externality by returning an appropriate fee or cost to the potential wrongdoer. 
12 For example Steven Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety’ 
(1984) The Journal of Legal Studies 13(2): 357–74.
13 See in this respect especially the seminal book by Neil Gunningham and Peter 
Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press 1998).
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Most commonly implemented are the Pigouvian taxes, but there is in fact 
a range of options including subsidies for desired behaviour and emission 
trading systems.
Suasive mechanisms: Beyond public regulation and market-based mecha-
nisms another option has emerged – that of ‘nudging’ the regulated industry 
in a particular direction. This can be achieved by use of so-called ‘defaults’ in 
compliance efforts or by educational or informational publication campaigns.
Private regulation: Finally, an alternative to command and control regula-
tion is that standards would be developed by non-government private actors. 
Those standards could be developed by the regulated industry itself (which is 
generally qualified as self-regulation) or by other private parties (such as stand-
ardisation organisations). The latter is indicated as private standard-setting.
In fact, from an economic perspective, the standard, in the sense of the 
optimal mechanism to remedy the market failure, can be implemented via 
any of the abovementioned instruments. One important question which arises 
nowadays is which instrument is appropriate to cure which particular market 
failure and whether it is possible to design an optimal so-called smart combi-
nation (mix) of different instruments.14
2.3 What Are Standards?
The nature of the standard depends very much on the type of market failure 
to be cured. For example, if the market failure consists of a negative exter-
nality (such as pollution or traffic accidents) the standard in its simplest form 
consists in the result of a marginal cost/marginal benefit weighing leading 
to a behavioural standard, sometimes referred to as a standard of care. More 
specifically, the marginal cost of additional preventive efforts (for example, 
more expensive pollution abatement equipment) would be weighed against the 
marginal benefits in reducing the likelihood of an accident (or environmental 
harm). The result of this balancing process is the definition of an optimal care 
standard, that is, the point where the marginal cost of prevention equals the 
marginal benefits in the reduction of the probability of the accident.15 Such 
a (theoretically optimal) standard can in principle be incorporated into any 
of the legal or policy instruments discussed in the previous subsection. Thus, 
14 See in that respect inter alia Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Global Environmental 
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context’ (1999) The Yale Law Journal 
108: 677–800 and Judith van Erp, Michael G Faure, André Nollkaemper and Niels 
J Philipsen (eds), Smart Mixes in Relation to Transboundary Environmental Harm 
(Cambridge University Press 2019).
15 The seminal paper in this respect is Steven Shavell, ‘Strict Liability versus 
Negligence’ (1980) The Journal of Legal Studies 9(1): 1–25.
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for example, the optimal care standard could relate to a due care standard in 
liability law, could be implemented via mandatory public regulation (such as 
a condition in a specific permit) or could be introduced as a tax which would 
apply for any behaviour in excess of the optimal care standard. In other words, 
from this perspective, standards are much broader than often defined in the 
legal literature and can in principle be found in any of the legal and policy 
instruments previously discussed.
2.4 Types of Standards
It is important to mention that the economic literature distinguishes between 
various types of standards.16 A target standard prescribes no specific standard 
regarding the output, but imposes (criminal) liability for certain harmful 
consequences arising from the output. Target standards focus on a prohibited 
consequence and leave it to the undertaking to determine the cheapest means 
of avoiding that consequence.17
A second type of standard is referred to as a performance (or output) stand-
ard. This requires certain conditions of quality to be met at the point of supply 
(for example, emission levels), but leaves the supplier free to choose how 
to meet those conditions.18 An example of a performance standard would be 
an emission limit value with which the undertaking has to comply regarding 
the wastewater emitted into the surface waters: the performance standard is 
monitored and liability rises if the standard is not met. The way to reach that 
particular standard can still be determined by the undertaking.
A third type of standard is a specification (or input) standard. That compels 
an undertaking to employ particular production methods or materials and is 
therefore highly interventionist.19 The major disadvantages of those specifica-
tion standards is that they may lack any incentive for innovation: undertakings 
will only have to comply with the specified technology and have no incentives 
to further invest in research and development. Moreover, specification stand-
ards (requiring the use of one particular technology) can be highly anticompet-
itive.20 The specification standard is an example of a remedy for a particular 
market failure (a negative externality) which may cause another market failure 
(restrictions on competition).
16 More particularly Ogus, above n. 10, 150–79 and Philipsen, above n. 4, 29–32.
17 Ogus, above n. 10, 166.
18 Ogus, above n. 10, 151.
19 Ibid.
20 Ogus, above n. 10, 167–8.
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2.5 Private Standard-setting
The legal debate concerning standardisation (and also many contributions 
to this volume) equate standardisation with private standard-setting. As was 
made clear in the previous sections, however, from an economic perspective, 
standardisation refers more generally to a variety of instruments that can be 
used to cure market failures. Private standards would fit into private regula-
tion. Private regulation refers to standard-setting by non-governmental private 
entities. In particular cases, private regulation can be self-regulation. This 
refers to the case where the standards are set by the regulated industry itself. 
In this case we focus on private standard-setting, that is, on standards set by 
private entities (such as standardisation organisations) but not by the regulated 
community itself.
Before focusing more closely on the costs and benefits of private 
standard-setting in the next section, it is from the outset important to stress 
that one lesson from the economic literature is that private standards are only 
one possible way of curing market failures. If it would appear that the costs 
of private standard-setting outweigh the advantages, it remains important to 
recall that (as stressed in Section 2.2) there are many other legal and policy 
instruments that could be used as an alternative to private standards.
3. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PRIVATE 
STANDARD-SETTING
The law and economics literature has pointed to particular advantages and 
disadvantages of private standard-setting.21
21 See inter alia Anthony Ogus, ‘Self-regulation’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and 
Gerrit De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 
587–602; Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Towards Efficient Self-Regulation in Markets 
for Professional Services’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), 
European Competition Law Annual 2004: The Relationship between Competition 
Law and the (Liberal) Professions (Hart Publishing 2006) 155–76; Roger Van den 
Bergh, ‘De maatschappelijke wenselijkheid van gedragscodes vanuit rechtsecono-
misch perspectief’ (2008) Weekblad voor Privaatreecht, Notariaat en Registratie 139: 
792–8, and Niels J Philipsen, ‘Professional Licensing and Self-Regulation in Europe 
and China: A Law and Economics Perspective’ in Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang 
(eds), Competition Policy and Regulation: Recent Developments in China, the US and 
Europe (Edward Elgar 2011) 205–37; Niels J Philipsen, ‘The Role of Private Actors in 
Preventing Work-Related Risks: A Law and Economics Perspective’ (2018) European 
Public Law 24(3): 539–53.
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The main arguments presented in the literature will be reviewed here, as 
these arguments might provide an important contribution to the current debate 
in the legal literature on private standards. 
3.1 Potential Advantages
There are several advantages identified in the law and economics liter-
ature. It should be noted that some of the literature deals generally with 
private regulation, without distinguishing between private standard-setting 
and self-regulation. Some arguments may play out differently in the case of 
private standards rather than self-regulation. Traditional advantages of private 
standard-setting might be:
• Lower information costs. Private standard-setters often have greater exper-
tise and technical knowledge, which could reduce information costs for cre-
ating the standards (as compared to standard-setting by the government).22
• Private standard-setting can also be more flexible than public regulation. 
Private standard-setting does not have the disadvantages of a bureaucracy 
and therefore has greater flexibility. This implies that private standards 
can be more easily adapted to changing circumstances. Potentially, 
private standards are therefore more dynamic than public regulation. 
Private standard-setting may also have the advantage that there is not the 
danger (as with public regulation) that standards are created that limit 
consumer choice or restrict innovation.23 The assumption in the literature 
is that, under private standard-setting, there may be better incentives for 
the standard-setter to create flexible differentiated standards which can 
dynamically follow, for example, evolutions in technology. Whether that 
assumption always holds is of course an empirical issue.
• Another advantage of private standards is that normally the administrative 
and compliance costs are lower. The creation of private standards will 
often be paid by the regulated community and will thus not negatively 
affect the public budget, being paid not by taxpayers, but rather by the 
consumers of the services or products.24
22 Ogus, above n. 10, 97–8; Van den Bergh, above n. 21, 7; Philipsen, above n. 21, 
544–5. 
23 Ogus, above n. 10, 98; Van den Bergh, above n. 21, 8; Philipsen, above n. 21, 
545.
24 Ibid.
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3.2 Potential Disadvantages
Economists also see potential disadvantages in private regulation. Those dis-
advantages are not only economic in nature, but sometimes refer to arguments 
presented by lawyers as well.25
Private standards may be the result of capturing of the standard-setting 
entity (even when it is a private entity). In cases where standards are purchased 
by the regulated community, the private standard-setters are in a dependent 
relationship with that regulated community. That relationship creates the 
suspicion that private standard-setters may not always have an interest in 
creating optimal standards. Reputational mechanisms may drive private 
standard-setters towards the creation of optimal standards, but it is not always 
clear if that reputational mechanism is sufficiently strong to incentivise private 
standard-setters towards optimal standard-setting.26
This danger of inefficient standard-setting can result in inefficiently low 
technical standards or inefficiently high technical standards. The danger of 
low technical standards arises especially in cases where no prior technical 
standards (private or public) exist. Compliance with high technical standards 
would then create high costs for industry, which might therefore lobby the 
private standard-setter for (too) low technical standards. However, in some 
cases frontrunners in industry (with informational advantages) may lobby for 
precisely the reverse: very high technical standards. De facto frontrunners in 
industry can already comply with those stricter standards. Raising them to 
(semi-compulsory) obligations via private standard-setting would have the 
advantage of creating barriers to market entry for competitors. This is the 
well-known phenomenon of ‘trading up’, whereby frontrunners in industry 
lobby for severe (public or private) standards to create barriers to market 
entry.27
Private standard-setting may more generally result in anticompetitive 
behaviour. In some cases, the mere fact that private standards are created could 
amount to an agreement between industry to follow particular standards, thus 
restricting competition in the market.28 Compare in that respect the argument 
against specification standards (see Section 2.4) as being anticompetitive. This 
25 For a summary of these arguments see Willem H van Boom, Michael G Faure, 
Nick JH Huls and Niels J Philipsen, Handelspraktijken, reclame en zelfregulering 
(Boom Juridische uitgevers 2009) 31–2.
26 See generally Philipsen, above n. 4 and Philipsen, above n. 21, referring also to 
the public choice literature.
27 See generally David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental 
Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard University Press 1997).
28 See Ogus, above n. 10, 99 and Van den Bergh, above n. 21, 8.
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problem could be avoided if there were sufficient competition between dif-
ferent private standard-setters. However, in many cases the number of private 
standard-setters is very limited or de facto even restricted to one supplier of 
private standards. Moreover, if there is competition between private standards, 
there is the danger that private standard-setters will not compete with higher 
(that is, closer to the optimum) standards, but rather by offering standards that 
please the regulated community. If there is no remedy for that type of destruc-
tive competition, adverse selection may occur,29 as a result of which only those 
private standard-setters that please the regulated community would survive in 
the market.
Furthermore, the abovementioned advantage of private standards as being 
more flexible has a flipside, namely that flexibility possibly comes at the cost 
of less secure and precise procedures.30 Private standards can be created more 
easily and at a lower cost, for example, because they do not have to take into 
account requirements of democratic accountability (inherent in public regu-
lation), transparency or public participation. This may make the creation of 
standards more flexible, cheaper and easier, but obviously has disadvantages 
for the contents of the standards. The lack of transparency, public participation 
and democratic accountability mechanisms also imply that the already men-
tioned danger of takeover of the private standards by the regulated community 
becomes even more serious as there is no countervailing power against indus-
try lobbying.
A final disadvantage of private standard-setting is that usually private 
standard-setting organisations create standards, but are not always involved 
in enforcement. In some cases other private institutions (such as certification 
societies) may verify compliance with the private standards, but generally 
compliance and enforcement remain a weak point of private standard-setting.31
3.3 Legitimacy and Accountability
Having addressed some potential advantages and disadvantages of private 
standard-setting, it has become clear that some of the arguments advanced in 
legal literature can also be understood from an economic perspective. Lawyers 
often criticise private standards for lacking legitimacy and democratic con-
trol.32 The worries expressed by lawyers concerning the private character of 
29 Akerlof, above n. 8.
30 Philipsen, above n. 21, 545.
31 Van Boom et al, above n. 25.
32 See for example Linda Senden, ‘Smart Public–Private Complementarities in 
the Transnational Regulatory and Enforcement Space’ in Judith van Erp, Michael 
G Faure, André Nollkaemper and Niels J Philipsen (eds), Smart Mixes in Relation 
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the standards (and the lack of democratic control and transparency) can also 
be understood from an economic perspective. In his famous work on the logic 
of collective action, Mancur Olson indicated that lobbying by private interest 
groups will largely be successful if two conditions are fulfilled:33
Low transaction costs for the lobby group: The group should be ‘single-issue 
oriented’ and well organised. Small groups with clearly defined goals have 
a relatively large likelihood of being successful in lobbying, as the costs of 
organising the group and agreeing on a particular strategy will be low.
High information costs for the public at large: Lobbying will result in 
so-called rent seeking by the interest group.34 This means that the special 
interest group will get particular benefits (rents) as a result of the lobbying to 
the disadvantage of the public at large. An important condition for successful 
lobbying is that the public at large does not discover that rent seeking is taking 
place. If private standards are formulated in an atmosphere of secrecy behind 
the veil of professionalism and confidentiality without transparency, account-
ability or public participation, private standards are more likely to serve the 
interests of industry rather than the interests of the public at large. Public 
choice theory predicts that these features increase the likelihood of inefficient 
standard-setting.
Public choice theory may equally provide a remedy: if transparency is 
increased and accountability mechanisms are introduced, the costs of lobbying 
increase and the likelihood that private standards are made only in the interests 
of industry decrease. Mechanisms such as transparency, accountability and 
public participation can in economic terms reduce information costs for the 
public at large and therefore increase the quality of private standard-setting. 
Arguments for increasing public participation in standard-setting can be found 
in the work of Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker. Unlike the abovementioned 
public choice school (Buchanan, Olson), Becker presented a theory of com-
petition between interest groups for political power.35 Becker holds that if 
to Transboundary Environmental Harm (Cambridge University Press 2019) 25–48 
and Fabrizio Cafaggi, A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Private Regulation: 
Legitimacy, Quality, Effectiveness and Enforcement, EUI Working Paper LAW 
2014/15 (2014).
33 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups (Harvard University Press 1971). Note that Olson’s criteria for successful col-
lective action of course refer to lobbying at the level of the government; the criteria 
may, however, also explain the relative success of interest groups in capturing private 
standard-setting agencies.
34 See James Buchanan, Robert Tollison and Gordon Tullock, Toward a Theory of 
the Rent-Seeking Society (A&M University 1980).
35 Gary S Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence’ (1983) Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371–400. See also Philipsen, 
above n. 4, 26.
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various interest groups representing different interests compete for political 
influence, the comparative process that results should not necessarily lead to 
inefficiency. A normative conclusion from this insight is that it is important to 
organise a countervailing power against the interests of industry in the private 
standard-setting process. Allowing effective participation by, for example, 
NGOs or civil society in the private standard-setting process decreases the risk 
of capturing by industry.36 In this case, private standard-setting could become 
more a Becker-like comparative process where countervailing interests also 
provide input to guarantee that private standards are set in the public interest.
Finally, it is important to stress that the lack of transparency and accounta-
bility in the private standard-setting mechanism will not automatically lead to 
inefficient standards. In some cases, the market and reputational controls can 
be so strong that corporate actors will themselves strive for the imposition of 
optimal standards. Food safety can provide an example. Large supermarket 
chains which are globally active are very sensitive to food scandals, which 
they want to avoid at all costs. As a result, these large chains often rely on 
private standard-setting when, for example, products are purchased on the 
international market (in Asia or Africa). Those large commercial chains will 
contract certification societies to verify (via a variety of different monitoring 
techniques) whether the products they wish to buy correspond to the private 
standards. Even though this type of private standard-setting too has been the 
subject of criticism (again from the perspective of lacking accountability, 
control and legitimacy)37 and even though private standards and certification 
may not be able to prevent all food safety risks,38 it could be argued that in 
this particular case the lack of transparency and accountability concerning 
the creation of the private standards should not necessarily lead to inefficient 
standards. On the contrary, large chains can suffer larger reputational losses 
from an outbreak of a food crisis and will therefore have powerful incentives to 
enforce high private standards on their contracting partners. Moreover, those 
contracting partners wishing to export to Europe and to be able to contract 
with those large chains will also have powerful incentives to comply with 
36 The problem may arise that NGOs could participate in the standardisation 
process, but that they may not be able to effectively influence the process because they 
do not have the means to compete with the power of the industry. In that sense mere 
participation may not be sufficient: it has to be an effective participation.
37 See for example Elena Fagoto, Industry Food Safety Standards: Public and 
Private Interest in Food Safety, PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(2015).
38 See further Michael Faure, ‘The Economics of Harmonization of Food Law in 
the EU’ in Harry Bremmers and Kai Purnhagen (eds), Regulating and Managing Food 
Safety in the EU: A Legal-Economic Perspective (Springer 2018) 263–90.
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the imposed standards. The only problem that may arise is that in some cases 
small producers, more particularly in developing countries, may not be able 
to comply with the high (private or public) standards imposed by importing 
countries in the developed world.39 However, from the perspective of the 
consumers in the developed world in the north in that particular case, the lack 
of transparency and accountability may not be a problem. In that case reputa-
tional and market mechanisms will provide sufficient guarantees for enacting 
and enforcing optimal standards. But again: those incentives resulting from 
market pressures may be present with large chains who have a reputation at 
stake, but might not be present with smaller sellers. The latter may especially 
be a problem with occasional producers, so-called rogue traders who would 
engage in a ‘hit and run’ strategy. To them the fear of a reputational loss may 
not be a serious deterrent.
This example shows that the desirability of private standard-setting should 
probably be differentiated depending upon the particular risks and cases, 
related inter alia to the question of whether the market actors concerned still 
have sufficient interests (as a result of reputational and market pressures) to 
comply with high (private) standards. If the latter is the case then the lack of 
transparency and accountability in private standard-setting should not neces-
sarily lead to a decrease of social welfare and they are therefore, at least from 
an economic perspective, not necessarily problematic.
3.4 Criteria for Private Standard-setting?
As the various chapters in this volume make clear, private standard-setting is 
now widely used in almost all areas where market failures need to be controlled. 
We provided examples from food safety, professional services (accountants, 
lawyers, architects) and environmental standards. But private standard-setting 
also appears in airline security,40 and even in nuclear safety, where the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) plays an important role.
Given the previous subsections in which potential advantages and disadvan-
tages of private standards were presented, the question arises as to whether it 
would be possible to identify domains where the use of private standard-setting 
would be appropriate and domains where it would be less appropriate. 
Considering the domains where private standard-setting plays a role today, one 
could argue that private standards may work well in domains where market 
39 See, for a detailed account of the difficulties experienced by shrimp producers 
in Benin wishing to export to the EU, Kévine Kindji-Gaspard, Market Access Issues 
in International Food Trade: Shrimp Exports from Benin to the EU, PhD dissertation, 
Maastricht University (2015).
40 Senden, above n. 32.
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forces and reputational mechanisms still play an important role (such as with 
food safety). In those cases the advantages of private standard-setting might 
outweigh the disadvantages. In other domains, such as nuclear safety, private 
standard-setting may be less obviously beneficial and an argument could be 
made for a more restricted role for private standards. 
It remains important, however, to keep in mind alternatives to private 
standard-setting. One way of dealing with the disadvantages of private 
standard-setting would be to improve the alternatives (public regulation, 
private law or market-based instruments). An obvious alternative to private 
standard-setting would be to make public regulation more flexible, more 
dynamic and thus closer to the beneficial features of private standard-setting.41
While analysing the choice between licensing and certification in relation to 
services, Shapiro argued that several criteria are relevant.42 More specifically, 
the choice depends inter alia on the heterogeneity of consumer preferences, the 
relationship between human capital and quality, the presence of reputational 
effects and the marginal costs of providing high quality. It may be possible to 
develop similar criteria related to the choice between private standard-setting 
and its alternatives.
An important lesson from the discussion of the potential disadvantages 
of private standard-setting (addressed in Section 3.2) is that some of those 
problems (competition problems, a lack of sanctioning mechanisms and 
inefficiently low or high standards) could be addressed by specific remedies. 
Competition problems could, for example, be addressed by using private 
standard-setting only when there are more private standard-setters available 
in the market who compete on quality and where adverse selection can be 
avoided. The lack of sanctioning mechanisms could be dealt with, for example, 
by reporting obligations (obliging the regulated community to report on their 
compliance with the private standards), by using private or public certifiers 
who monitor compliance with the private standards and by having public 
authorities verifying compliance with private standards as well. The danger 
of inefficiently low or high standards could be remedied by introducing the 
transparency and accountability mechanisms discussed in Section 3.3 and by 
allowing for public participation in the standard-setting process, thus provid-
ing for a countervailing power. Those remedies could improve the likelihood 
that private standards are also set in the public interest.
41 See also Philipsen, above n. 21, 547–8.
42 See Carl Shapiro, ‘Premiums for High-Quality Products as Rents to Reputation’ 
(1983) Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(4): 659–80; Carl Shapiro, ‘Investment, 
Moral Hazard and Occupational Licensing’ (1986) Review of Economic Studies 53(5): 
843–62.
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4. HARMONISATION?
Another question that is widely debated in the legal domain is whether private 
standards should be harmonised at EU level or can be differentiated at Member 
State level. Again, law and economics have developed particular criteria, 
which might prove interesting to review.
4.1 Economics of Federalism Perspective
The economic literature with respect to externalities has taken as a starting 
point, following the seminal work of Tiebout,43 that competition between legal 
orders has the advantage that regulation and standards will be provided that 
best correspond to the preferences of citizens.44 The starting point is therefore 
that decentralisation has the advantage of providing standards that match 
in an optimal way the local preferences of citizens. Regulatory competition 
increases the quality of regulation and the existence of various regulatory 
regimes moreover has the advantage of creating possibilities for mutual 
learning.45 From that simple starting point, economists would argue that the 
mere existence of different private standards should as such not be considered 
problematic. On the contrary, given the large variety in market participants 
and local circumstances, there may be major benefits in having differentiated 
standards corresponding to differing preferences of citizens. Van den Bergh 
therefore argues that because the preferences of citizens (for example on food 
quality) may differ, the same may be seen with regulation (and private stand-
ards) among Member States.46
Centralisation may, however, be warranted when particular market fail-
ures exist. One market failure which was already mentioned is the danger of 
transboundary externalities. Again, the case of food safety standards could 
be illustrative: if the issue concerns not merely food quality but food safety, 
centralisation might be warranted. Negative externalities require a centralised 
response where the preferences of consumers are sufficiently homogeneous, 
43 Charles M Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) Journal of 
Political Economy 64(5): 416–24.
44 See in this respect inter alia Wallace E Oates and Robert M Schwab, ‘Economic 
Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?’ 
(1988) Journal of Public Economics 35(3): 333–54.
45 Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory 
Competition in Europe’ (2000) Kyklos 53: 435–66.
46 Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Farewell Utopia? Why the European Union Should Take 
the Economics of Federalism Seriously’ (2016) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 23(6): 937–64.
Michael Faure and Niels Philipsen - 9781789902952
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/13/2021 01:07:41PM
via Maastricht University Library
The Legitimacy of Standardisation as a Regulatory Technique172
‘such as a general desire for food safety. In this way rules combating the BSE 
disease may be supported’.47 That therefore means that if the use of private 
standards entails the risk of transboundary externalities (which is surely not 
always the case) there may be an argument for centralisation limited to this 
particular risk.
A second argument for centralisation relates to the danger of a race to the 
bottom. Usually competition between private standards would have beneficial 
effects and improve social welfare.48 Only if there were empirical evidence 
that Member States would compete with each other via the creation of private 
standards that would be inefficiently low in order to attract industry would 
there be an argument for centralisation.49 Again, whether a danger of a race 
to the bottom exists will very much depend upon the specific sector. It cannot 
generally be concluded that the mere existence of different private standards 
would necessarily lead to a race to the bottom. Again, that will all depend upon 
factual circumstances and therefore needs empirical support.
A final reason for centralisation would be the existence of economies of 
scale and transaction cost savings resulting from the harmonisation to one 
private standard.50 The argument holds that the existence of different stand-
ards creates costs and that harmonising those differences to one standard 
would reduce those costs. This argument is obviously flawed, as it neglects 
the benefits of differentiation (standards being better adapted to the varying 
preferences of citizens). Moreover, the argument also wrongly assumes that 
the harmonisation of private standards would be a costless exercise.
Summarising, from the perspective of the economics of federalism, the mere 
existence of various private standards should not be a reason to call for harmo-
nisation. That would only be warranted in the case of clear proof that private 
standards would lead to an externalisation of harm to other jurisdictions or if 
there were empirical evidence that private standards would be used in a race to 
the bottom. There is no a priori reason to believe that this would be the case.
47 Van den Bergh, above n. 46, 951.
48 Richard L Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
Race-for-the-bottom Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (1992) New 
York University Law Review 67: 1210–54.
49 Michael G Faure, ‘Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: 
Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?’ [1998] European Environmental Law Review 
171–2.
50 Faure, above n. 49, 173.
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4.2 Internal Market Perspective
In addition to the economics of federalism there is another theoretical per-
spective to the question of harmonisation, which is the so-called internal 
market perspective. Many harmonisation efforts at EU level are based on the 
idea that harmonised rules would facilitate the free flow of persons, products, 
services and capital, or in other words that harmonised rules would promote 
the internal market.51 The argument holds that private standards could create 
barriers to trade if different Member States were to apply different standards. 
Harmonising private standards would then be needed to support free trade. The 
problem with this argument is that, even if all private standards were (hypo-
thetically) harmonised, this would not create a level playing field in the EU 
as differences in, for example, energy resources, access to raw materials and 
atmospheric conditions will still lead to differing marketing conditions that 
favour trade. In addition, there are examples of integrated markets (without 
distortions of trade) with a strong differentiation, for example of rules of 
private law. That is the case, for example, in the United States and Switzerland. 
Notwithstanding strong differences between rules of private law, there are no 
significant impediments to trade as a result of those differences. Empirical 
evidence also suggests that it is not because of differences in legal rules that 
consumers do not engage in cross-border trade, but rather as a result of other 
impediments (such as distance, language and so on).52 The idea that the internal 
market would require a harmonisation of private standards can therefore not be 
supported by economic theory. 
4.3 Policy Perspective
What follows from the previous discussion is that, within the EU legal debate, 
it may be too easily concluded that private standards need to be harmonised. 
From the economics of federalism perspective, it needs to be shown that 
differentiated standards actually create transboundary externalities or a race 
to the bottom, or lead to substantial transaction cost savings that exceed the 
costs of drafting and implementing EU law without overriding the preferences 
of citizens. 
51 For a detailed analysis of these two different economic approaches to harmoni-
sation, see Miriam C Buiten, Harmonisation and the EU Internal Market: A Law and 
Economics Approach, PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam (2017).
52 Kirsten Thommes, Michael G Faure and Klaus Heine, ‘The Internal Market and 
the Consumer: What Consumers Actually Choose’ (2014) The Columbia Journal of 
European Law 21(1): 47–70.
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Moreover, it has also been stressed in law and economics literature that the 
internal market argument is only one side of the coin. Even if it could be shown 
that harmonised private standards were to facilitate trade, they still would have 
the major disadvantage of restricting competition. In the words of Ogus, ‘In the 
light of the welfare losses arising from over-reaching differences in national 
preferences, full harmonisation may be undesirable, at least in some areas of 
regulation’.53 The law and economics literature has indicated that in some 
domains (such as regulating foodstuffs), EU harmonisation has gone much too 
far, based on the internal market argument. Van den Bergh argues: 
However, many EU Directives look like recipes in a (poor quality) cook book. 
Examples include the rules on the composition of chocolate, jam and fruit juices. 
It may be doubted whether the best brains in Brussels should spend their precious 
time on fixing the amount of cocoa butter, vegetable feds and milk and chocolate, 
deciding the amount of sugar in fruit juices and nectars, defining tomato juice as 
fruit juice and determining the fruit content in jam, jellies and marmalade.54
He therefore concludes:
Again, this does not imply that there is no need for EU legislation, but rules should 
be restricted to cases where the benefits of centralisation outweigh its disadvantages. 
The Directives on the composition of foodstuffs cannot be explained by welfare 
considerations, but rather as the result of a political compromise between pressure 
groups from industry and attempts to shelter the ‘fortress Europe’ from imports of 
Africa (palm oil).55
A few final comments in this respect: first, differentiated private standards 
do not necessarily endanger trade and even if that were the case, it does not 
necessarily call for harmonisation. Alternative remedies could be sought (less 
restrictive of competition), such as mutual recognition of different private 
standards.56
Second, recent literature has also indicated that the criteria for centralisation 
may (under restrictive conditions) point to a need for centralisation, but not 
necessarily harmonisation. That would imply that in some circumstances deci-
sions could be shifted to the EU level, for example if there were transboundary 
externalities or evidence of a race to the bottom, but differentiated standards 
53 Ogus, above n. 10, 176.
54 Van den Bergh, above n. 46, 951.
55 Ibid.
56 On the remedy of mutual recognition and its advantages compared to harmonisa-
tion, see Wolfgang Kerber and Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Mutual Recognition Revisited: 
Misunderstandings, Inconsistencies, and a Suggested Reinterpretation’ (2008) Kyklos 
61(3): 447–65.
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(taking into account varying local preferences) could still be applied.57 
Moreover, recently the Ostrom model of polycentric governance has also been 
applied to the EU again pleading in favour of a multidimensional approach of 
competition between various layers of legislators and standard-setters.58
Third, the criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU could also be used to analyse 
regulatory instruments such as private standards.59 This again implies that 
many remedies are possible to deal with some of the more problematic aspects 
of private standard-setting, but that those aspects do not necessarily lead to the 
need for harmonisation.
4.4 Improving Private Standard-setting?
The question arises whether it is possible to address the disadvantages of 
private standard-setting (mentioned in Section 3.2) and still enjoy some of its 
benefits (mentioned in Section 3.1).
A few remedies have already been suggested above (in Section 3.3) which 
might better guarantee that private standard-setting comes closer to the optimal 
standard. Some of these suggestions can now be combined.
A first possibility is to increase the costs of lobbying by private interest 
groups, thus reducing the risk of capturing of the private standard-setter. One 
way to do this is to improve the transparency of the private standard-setting 
process; another is to allow for a countervailing power in that private 
standard-setting process, for example by NGOs or civil society. Private 
standard-setting would then be made more accountable and comply with 
higher standards of transparency, also including public participation and dem-
ocratic accountability. A problem, however, is that private standard-setting 
was introduced precisely because it was claimed to be more flexible, dynamic, 
cheaper and easier than public regulation since it is easier to formulate and 
adapt private standards. Adaptations to changing technology would for that 
reason be much easier with private standards, precisely because it is not 
hindered by the complicated decision-making procedures underlying public 
regulation. There is therefore an inherent risk that, when all the accountability 
and transparency guarantees (typical for public regulation) are also required 
57 See in this respect Alessandra Arcuri, ‘Controlling Environmental Risk in 
Europe: The Complementary Role of an EC Environmental Liability Regime’ (2001) 
Tijdschrift voor Milieu en Recht 15(2): 37–45.
58 Josephine van Zeben, ‘Subsidiarity in European Environmental Law: 
A Competence Allocation Approach’ (2014) Harvard Environmental Law 38: 415–64.
59 See further Niels J Philipsen and Hans Maks, ‘An Economic Analysis of the 
Regulation of Professions’ in Evy Crals and Lode Vereeck (eds), Regulation of 
Architects in Belgium and the Netherlands (Lannoo Campus 2005) 11–45.
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for private standard-setting, the costs of private standard-setting eventually 
become as high as the costs of public standard-setting. This is a danger in the 
tendency of ‘democratising’ private standard-setting, which is also indicated 
in the literature.60
A second solution is to envisage the creation of competition between differ-
ent standards and different standard-setters. The problem has been addressed 
above. By avoiding a monopoly of one particular private standard-setter there 
could in theory be a better guarantee of optimal private standard-setting. This 
would also have the advantage that different types of private standards would 
emerge in the market whereby service and product providers could choose 
from different standards depending, inter alia, on the market in which they 
operate. However, the danger is always that when more private standards are 
created, this may lead to a race to the bottom towards the lowest standard. 
Precisely because industrial operators pay the private standard-setters, there 
may be a danger of adverse selection whereby in the end only inefficient 
standards appear on the market. Competition might entail the risk of a watering 
down of standards. The question also arises as to whom the specific standards 
are addressed. If the standards address industrial operators, they may well be 
able to choose standards which best fit their needs and preferences. However, 
if private standards are also meant as signalling instruments towards the end 
consumers, it is well known that increasing the amount of standards is not 
always beneficial for consumers’ understanding. A large number of available 
standards might lead not only to watering down, but also to confusion among 
consumers, as happened inter alia with eco-labelling.61
A third possible solution would be to strive for particular forms of hybrid or 
co-regulation. That would imply that private standard-setting would still play 
a role, but would not be the sole instrument to control market failures. Private 
standard-setting would in that model be used in a smart mix with other instru-
ments that could remedy the market failure (see Section 2.2). This could take 
several forms. One possibility would be so-called conditional self-regulation,62 
which basically entails that the government specifies under which types of con-
ditions it will rely on self- (or private) regulation. There could be a government 
determination of the specific conditions under which private standard-setting 
would be accepted, whereby public enforcement could, for example, also play 
a role in monitoring compliance with the conditions of private standards. It 
would also be possible to combine public and private regulation, for example, 
60 More particularly by Senden, above n. 32.
61 On the law and economics of eco-labelling, see Alejandra Martinez Gandara, The 
Law and Economics of Eco-Labels, PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(2013).
62 Van den Bergh, above n. 21, 156; Philipsen, above n. 21, 212.
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through an accreditation by public authorities of particular private standards. 
That would imply that standards are still set privately, but that the government 
would control the quality of particular private standards and accredit the use 
of particular private standards that have been certified. The ‘New Approach’ 
to technical harmonisation and standards, as introduced in the EU in 1985, can 
be interpreted as one example of such a hybrid form of regulation. In the New 
Approach, all products and services that are in accordance with harmonised 
standards are presumed to conform to the ‘essential requirements’ defined in 
EU legislation; and public authorities must recognise these standards once they 
have been accepted.63 Of course, defining the ‘essential requirements’ properly 
remains crucial, as are the criteria of transparency and competition (already 
indicated above) when setting the standards.
It may seem that it is virtually impossible to achieve the best of both worlds. 
Whatever solution is chosen, the inevitable consequence will usually be that 
the flexibility of private standard-setting is reduced and that costs increase as 
well. The crucial question therefore is if it is possible to introduce some public 
law elements into private standard-setting in a proportionate manner that 
makes it possible to enjoy the benefits of private standard-setting without the 
disadvantages. This is obviously a very difficult balancing act.
5. CONCLUSION
This chapter provided the economic perspective on standardisation generally 
and on private standard-setting in particular. It was made clear that in the legal 
debate standardisation now has a very specific connotation, but that standards 
in economic terms can in fact appear in a wide variety of legal and policy 
instruments. Basically, they are meant to be tools to remedy market failures. 
Optimal standards take into account cost–benefit weighing.
The economic literature also makes it clear that it is important to distinguish 
between various questions which sometimes become blurred in the legal 
debate. A first question is whether private standards are at all appropriate 
and can be considered the most efficient instrument (perhaps in an optimal 
mix with other instruments) to solve a prevailing market failure or to achieve 
another policy goal. Yet another question is whether an intervention at EU 
level with respect to private standard-setting is required. In that respect one 
should carefully distinguish whether the goal of such an intervention would 
be to cure a market failure (transboundary externality, race to the bottom, very 
high transaction costs) or to promote the internal market. Law and economics 
also teaches us that if the latter policy goal is chosen, it is important to verify 
63 See Chapter 1.
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whether other (less intrusive or costly) measures than full harmonisation could 
equally provide a remedy and whether harmonisation can be considered a pro-
portional remedy, also given the potential anticompetitive effects.
The law and economics literature pointed to several potential advantages 
of private standard-setting, but also to potential disadvantages. Many of those 
disadvantages can be reformulated as legitimacy problems in legal terms. 
What is discussed in the legal literature under the heading of legitimacy will 
appear in the law and economics literature as the danger of capturing by 
special interest groups.64 A crucial question is whether eventually the actors 
concerned (the regulated community, but also the private standard-setters) still 
have sufficient incentives (also taking into account the payment structure) to 
safeguard the public interest rather than their private interests. In some cases, 
market and reputational mechanisms may guarantee that private and public 
interests align; at other times this might not be the case, as a result of which 
private standard-setting may be suboptimal.
In the latter case, a variety of remedies could be devised to make private 
standard-setting more legitimate. These remedies all relate to increasing 
the accountability of the private standard-setters, increasing transparency 
of the private standard-setting process and eventually even allowing public 
participation. Although including those public law elements into private 
standard-setting may undoubtedly have benefits, it will unavoidably come at 
the price of serious disadvantages in terms of flexibility and costs. If too strict 
conditions are imposed on private standard-setting, it is likely that all the ben-
efits of private standard-setting will disappear as well.
64 See in this respect inter alia Fritz W Scharpf, ‘Economic Integration, Democracy 
and the Welfare State’ (1997) Journal of European Public Policy 4(1): 18–36; Fritz W 
Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press 
1999).
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